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Late recognition of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) was associated with no known SARS contact, hos-
pitalization before the nosocomial outbreak was recog-
nized, symptom onset while hospitalized, wards with SARS
clusters, and postoperative status. SARS is difficult to rec-
ognize in hospitalized patients with a variety of underlying
conditions in the absence of epidemiologic links. 
S
evere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) spread glob-
ally in 2003, infecting >8,000 people and killing near-
ly 800. In total, 438 probable or suspected SARS cases and
44 deaths were reported in Canada (1,2). SARS was first
recognized retrospectively in Canada in a woman who had
returned from Hong Kong on February 23, 2003. This
international connection ignited the outbreak in Canada,
which affected mainly the Toronto area (1,2). 
After enhanced infection control precautions and public
health measures were implemented in March 2003, the
Canadian outbreak began to subside in April. On May 14,
the World Health Organization (WHO) took Toronto off
the list as a SARS-affected area in the absence of newly
reported cases for at least 2 incubation periods after the last
SARS case-patient was isolated. In accordance with public
health principles, the enhanced measures were selectively
relaxed in low-risk settings in Toronto area hospitals in
early May 2003, although full precautions were still rec-
ommended for patients with febrile respiratory illnesses. In
the third week of May, a cluster of febrile respiratory ill-
ness at a Toronto area rehabilitation hospital was reported
to the health department. Traceback of these SARS cases
identified the index patient as a postoperative patient who
was transferred from hospital X to the rehabilitation hospi-
tal. This link uncovered clusters of unrecognized SARS
infections on a surgical ward and a psychiatry ward at hos-
pital X. Investigation determined that the ventilation sys-
tem did not contribute to the spread of SARS at that
hospital. On May 23, 2003, hospital X was closed to
nonobstetric admissions other than newly identified SARS
cases, and SARS precautions were reintroduced. As part of
an outbreak investigation, we explored potential factors
contributing to the late recognition of SARS infections in
a cohort of persons with SARS admitted to hospital X.
The Study
Hospital X is a Toronto-area community hospital with
425 beds. During the 2003 outbreak in Toronto, dedicated
SARS inpatient units were created at the hospital. All non-
healthcare workers with probable or suspected SARS,
according to the WHO case definition (3), exposed at and
admitted to hospital X with symptom onset from April 17,
2003, to June 8, 2003, were included in this retrospective
cohort investigation. Healthcare workers were excluded. If
SARS was not recorded as a possible diagnosis in the med-
ical chart, despite SARS-defining manifestations for at
least 24 hours of hospitalization, recognition of SARS was
classified as late. Otherwise, recognition was classified as
prompt. Laboratory diagnosis of SARS was obtained by
reverse transcriptase–polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR)
or serologic testing (4,5). 
SPSS version 11.0 (SPSS, Inc., Chicago, IL, USA) was
used for statistical analysis. Continuous variables were
dichotomized about the median. Factors associated with
late recognition were deemed statistically significant if the
p value was <0.05 (2-tailed), using chi-square test with
Yates correction or Fisher exact test, when appropriate.
Relative risks with 95% confidence intervals were listed as
undefined when certain cell sizes were 0. The small sam-
ple size, small number of patients with the outcome of
interest (late SARS recognition), and small cell size for
some dichotomous variables precludes multivariate logis-
tic regression analysis. 
The SARS outbreak involved 88 case-patients whose
exposure setting was hospital X (Figure). SARS occurred
in 50 patients, family members, or visitors. Thirty-three of
these 50 persons were admitted to hospital X, and all 33
were included in this analysis. 
SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) laboratory
results were available for 29 (88%) of the 33 SARS
patients. No samples were available for SARS-CoVtesting
from 4 deceased patients. Twenty-four (83%) of the 29
SARS patients tested were positive by RT-PCR, serology,
or both. The 5 remaining patients had negative acute-phase
SARS-CoV serologic results, and their convalescent-phase
results were not available (data not shown). 
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Their mean age was 68.8 years, and 8 (73%) were postop-
erative patients. All were admitted before May 23, 2003,
the day when Hospital X reintroduced enhanced SARS
precautions. No case-patients had a recognized close con-
tact with another SARS patient initially. None were travel
related. (Table 1). Six (55%) patients were admitted to an
intensive care unit (ICU), and 3 (27%) required mechani-
cal ventilation (Table 2). All patients had infiltrates on
chest radiographs; infiltrates of 9 (81%) were bilateral. 
Using univariate analysis, we found that patients with
late recognition of SARS were more likely to have no
known contact with another SARS patient (p < 0.001), to
have been a patient on a ward where SARS cluster
occurred (p < 0.01), to be admitted before the nosocomial
outbreak was recognized at the hospital (p < 0.01), to have
symptom onset while hospitalized (p < 0.001), and to be a
postoperative patient. (p = 0.001) (Tables 1 and 2). Clinical
findings and laboratory abnormalities during hospitaliza-
tion were not associated with late SARS recognition. The
small sample size, small number of patients with late
SARS recognition, and small cell size for some dichoto-
mous variables precluded multivariate logistic regression
analysis.
The hospital reintroduced enhanced SARS precautions
on May 23, 2003, under the direction of public health
authorities promptly after the nosocomial outbreak was
recognized. For patients admitted before that date (N =
20), the relative risk for late recognition of SARS for post-
operative patients was 2.7 (95% confidence interval
0.99–7.2, p = 0.07) and was just short of statistical signif-
icance (data not shown). Once SARS transmission was
recognized at hospital X and enhanced infection control
precautions were reinstituted, clinicians were more likely
to suspect SARS, and nosocomial transmission was ended
abruptly.
Conclusions
Our results highlight the difficulty clinicians can have
in recognizing locally acquired SARS among patients with
other underlying medical conditions but with no apparent
epidemiologic linkage. The patients had no known contact
with other SARS patients, did not have a travel history to
SARS-affected areas outside of Canada when the outbreak
was thought to be over in Toronto, and were unaware of a
simmering outbreak associated with hospital X. Perhaps
because of the nonspecific nature of clinical manifesta-
tions, SARS can be especially difficult to recognize among
Late Recognition of SARS in Nosocomial Outbreak
Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 11, No. 2, February 2005 323
Figure. Reported probable and suspected severe acute respirato-
ry syndrome cases in persons (or their family members) with
symptom onset after April 17, 2003, whose exposure setting was
hospital X. patients already hospitalized for other reasons. These
symptoms overlap many of the symptoms of hospitalized
febrile postoperative patients and patients with other respi-
ratory illnesses (6–12). In addition, at the time of this noso-
comial outbreak, the full spectrum of the clinical signs and
symptoms of SARS had not yet been well characterized
(11).
To detect SARS early, health professionals need to look
not only for epidemiologic links but also clusters of unex-
plained respiratory infection. Acluster of respiratory infec-
tions among families and visitors may not be evident ini-
tially because hospitals do not normally track infections in
inpatients’ families and visitors. In addition, infected
patients may be asymptomatic before they are transferred
to another healthcare facility. 
Even though our investigation generated interesting
hypotheses, it had several limitations, which included
reliance on retrospective chart reviews to abstract data.
Such information may have been affected by missing data
or recall bias. Our analysis did not include hospital work-
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tal X but were subsequently admitted elsewhere. Studies
that include hospital workers and persons admitted to other
hospitals are needed. Seroprevalence studies will be help-
ful because some infected persons may not be sympto-
matic. The small sample size limited the power to detect
small differences and precluded multivariate analysis. A
small number of patients with a diagnosis of SARS may
not actually have been infected with SARS-CoV. This pos-
sibility could have biased the results either way. However,
this number is likely small because most case-patients test-
ed positive for SARS-CoV. 
Although our results highlight the challenge of recog-
nizing SARS among hospitalized patients, the occurrence
of seasonal respiratory infections such as influenza may
further compound the difficulty in identifying a SARS
case. In places where recent SARS transmission has
occurred, SARS should be considered during the evalua-
tion of nosocomial as well as community-acquired pneu-
monia. This recommendation is particularly important if
the hospital housed SARS patients within the previous 20
days or if unexplained febrile respiratory clusters had been
noticed within the institution. 
This nosocomial outbreak underscores the importance
of sharing information among clinicians, laboratories,
infection control departments, occupational health servic-
es, and public health departments and of collaborating
seamlessly in the search for clusters of respiratory infec-
tions. A sensitive infectious disease surveillance system
operated by the infection control officer must be in place
in healthcare facilities for early detection and implementa-
tion of appropriate measures to interrupt transmission
(13,14). This surveillance should include the monitoring of
increased absenteeism among healthcare workers; unusual
fever or pneumonia clusters among patients, family, visi-
tors, and healthcare workers; pneumonia deaths; and labo-
ratory testing for respiratory pathogens or SARS-CoV.
These steps require commitment, preparedness planning,
resources, and training. The lack of a rapid, sensitive, and
specific diagnostic test for early SARS infection hampers
the ability of clinicians to make a prompt diagnosis in
cases when an epidemiologic link is missing (15). 
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